This paper provides an analysis of outsourcing and trade in a spatial model à la Hotelling. In this setting, we discuss the trade-off between transport-cost-related disadvantages and outsourcing-related production cost advantages of a large economy and we investigate how the existence of national transport costs influences both the structure of industrial production and the pattern of final goods trade. In addition, the model gives a rich picture of the possible welfare effects of trade liberalization. In particular, we show that a final goods exporting country definitely gains from economic integration, while a final goods importing country may lose. Finally, when lowering domestic outsourcing activities, trade liberalization may reduce world welfare, even if pro-competitive effects lead to a decline in consumer prices.
Introduction
Trade theory has treated countries as points in space for a long time. By elaborating on the role of distance (or, more generally, transport costs) between two trading partners, existing models typically ignore geographical aspects of the involved countries and do not account for the location of producers and consumers within a particular economy. Such an approach may be justified if trade of two remote partners (e.g., the US and Japan) is the matter of interest, but it is less appropriate if transactions between two adjacent countries (such as the US and Canada) are considered. Then, intranational transport costs of the exporting and the importing country account for the lion's share of overall shipment costs, rendering the location of economic activity within two adjacent countries an important determinant of their trade.
In recent years, economists have become increasingly interested in how geographical aspects influence trade patterns and the welfare effects of economic integration. Tharakan and Thisse [18] associate countries with segments of a line and use a Hotelling framework to enrich the trade literature with insights from location theory. There, consumers are dispersed in space and the trade pattern crucially depends on the distance of the production sites in two adjacent economies from the common border. By focusing on final goods trade and assuming that consumers are uniformly distributed along the line, while production is concentrated in the center of economies, Tharakan and Thisse identify a transport-cost-related size disadvantage and show that small countries gain while large countries lose from trade liberalization.
While this paper builds on Tharakan and Thisse [18] , it puts the endogenous choice between an integrated production of final and intermediate goods versus outsourcing of the latter at the center of interest. As in previous research on vertical integration, the specialization on the intermediate and final production stages at the firm level is associated with lower marginal production costs. At the same time, setting up an intermediate goods production facility induces fixed start-up costs. As a consequence, input producers have an incentive to enter only if the market and thus their operating profits are quadratic transport costs in a model with final goods only. We use such a Hotelling framework with quadratic transport costs and account for a firm's decision to produce in-house versus purchasing intermediate goods from an outside supplier. Thereby, we associate greater country size with superior local outsourcing opportunities. The primary goal is to analyze the impact of outsourcing on both the pattern of final goods trade and the welfare effects of economic integration in a spatial model with national transport costs.
Treating a firm's boundaries as endogenous relates this paper to previous research on outsourcing which we contribute to in three ways. First, we provide a model in which national (Burda and Dluhosch [4] ) and international outsourcing (Kohler [10] ) can simultaneously occur. While there is now a broad consensus among economists that both types of outsourcing are important features of the recent wave of globalization, existing models typically consider only one of the two modes of intermediate goods transactions. 3 Second, we show how national transport costs affect the price choice of intermediate goods suppliers and thus the final goods producers' incentives for outsourcing part of their production to a specialized input supplier. 4 Third, we discuss how geographical distance and outsourcing opportunities interact in explaining the pattern of trade and the welfare effects of economic integration.
Finally, by accounting for both final and intermediate goods transactions, our analysis is also related to the spatial model of trade by Rossi-Hansberg [15] . The most important differences between his analysis and ours are the following. First, he focuses on a trade-off between agglomerative forces (through production externalities) and congestion (through extra costs of exporting production and importing intermediates as well as the scarcity 3 Two notable exceptions are Antràs and Helpman [2] and Grossman and Helpman [7] who analyze local and global sourcing in a general equilibrium North-South model. Yet in contrast to their approach, we use a partial equilibrium setting of two economies, which differ only in size but not in other economic fundamentals. 4 This relates our paper to a recent contribution by Helsley and Strange [9] who study the choice between integrated production and outsourcing as well as the locational decision of input producers in a uniform framework. In contrast to our study, however, they do not provide insights into the role of national transport costs for international outsourcing in a two-country setting.
of land) while we determine the interaction between two aspects of country size, namely the number of consumers and geographical distance. Second he considers outsourcing as given while the modeling of the endogenous choice between integration and outsourcing is at the heart of our paper's interest. Third, we base our analysis on a Hotelling framework while he does not.
Basic model set up
Consider a linear modelà la Hotelling with one final goods producer located at the center of a country with extension (length) l, i.e., at l/2. In the following, we use the notion "country l" for such an economy. The location of the final goods producer is fixed.
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Population in country l is uniformly distributed along the line [0, l] with one consumer located at each address b ∈ [0, l]. As in Tharakan and Thisse [18] , l refers to both the geographical size of the country and the mass of its population. Each consumer buys at most one unit of the final good. "Disutility" from a larger distance of consumers to the final goods producer is represented by quadratic transport costs. 6 The maximum acceptable price for the final good depends on the willingness to pay (A) and the location of a consumer along the line (b). It is given by A − (b − l/2) 2 , where l/2 is the position of the final goods producer.
As pointed out before, the contribution of this study is to allow for two different production technologies in a spatial model of trade. First, as in Shachmurove and Spiegel [16] and Tharakan and Thisse [18] , there is an integrated production mode, where the 5 Our assumption on the location of the final goods producer follows Tharakan and Thisse [18] , who remark that " [t] his location allows each firm to maximize its profit in autarky and is chosen once-andfor-all because firms show a strong spatial inertia" (p. 385). For the purpose of notational simplicity, we do not explicitly consider set-up costs of final goods producers. Hence, profits of final goods suppliers are equivalent to their operating profits. 6 The assumption of quadratic transport costs is not important for the autarky situation. However, this assumption will be crucial for the existence of a Nash-equilibrium in prices under free trade. See the discussion in Footnote 20, below. There is an extensive literature on the existence of price equilibria in linear models of spatial competition (see among others d'Aspremont et al. [5] ; Anderson [1] ; and Osborne and Pitchik [14] ). Hamoudi and Moral [8] investigate the existence under concave and convex transport costs. For the purpose of simplicity, we stick to the textbook case of quadratic transport costs.
whole production process takes place in-house. Second, the final goods producer may fragment the production process and engage in outsourcing by purchasing intermediate inputs from an external supplier at arm's length.
We assume that integrated production (index i) exhibits constant marginal costs c i , with A > c i > 0. In the case of outsourcing, the final goods producer -who is now a downstream producer (index d) -uses one unit of a component, purchased from an upstream input supplier (index u), to manufacture one unit of final output. There are no costs of final assembling and the specialized input supplier can manufacture the intermediate good at a lower cost than the final goods producer: c u < c i . Before production can be started, an input producer has to invest fixed costs in the amount of f to set up a production facility (at a certain point along the line They are given by,
If there is no input producer who supplies the required fragment, the final goods producer does not have access to outsourcing and is, 7 By assuming that the input producer sets the price for the intermediate good, we abstract from the hold-up problem that may otherwise govern the bilateral relationship between the seller and the buyer of an intermediate good, due to the fixed cost investment of the input producer. This is an important difference to McLaren [13] , who investigates the impact of international openness on vertical integration in a setting, in which the input producer is in danger of being held up by the downstream final goods producer. To address the hold-up problem, we have considered an alternative price-setting mechanism in a previous version of this manuscript. There, we have assumed that a contract on the fixed cost investment of the input producer is not possible (as this investment is not verifiable to outside parties) and we have investigated Nash bargaining as an alternative input price determination process. It turns out that such a modification renders the analysis more complicated without affecting the main results qualitatively. For a detailed discussion on the issue of Nash bargaining on input prices, see the working paper version of our manuscript in Egger and Egger [6] .
therefore, tied to the integrated production mode.
Autarky equilibrium
There is a sequence of five decisions that determines the autarky equilibrium: (i) A single input producer decides upon entry and location.
(ii) After entry, the input producer sets a price ρ vis-à-vis the final goods supplier (a monopolist in the final goods market). (iii)
Based on that price, the transport costs for input transactions and marginal production costs c i , the final goods producer chooses between in-house supply of the input (integration) and purchases from outside the firm (outsourcing). (iv) The final goods producer finishes the product and sets the mill price for the final good. 8 (v) Consumers make their purchases. See Figure 1 for a summary of these decisions.
>Figure 1<
The autarky equilibrium can be derived through backward induction.
Stage (v) -Consumption:
A consumer located at address b has positive demand if
2 , where p(b) denotes the consumer price, p is the final good's mill price and b − l/2 measures the distance between the respective consumer and the final goods producer (who, by assumption, is located at the center of the local market at address l/2). Since any consumer purchases at most one unit of final output, aggregate final goods demand is given by
8 We assume "mill pricing" in the context of final goods transactions since final goods producers face a large number of consumers. In contrast, we will allow for (spatial) price discrimination of input producers under free trade as the number of final goods suppliers is small. Indeed, setting a uniform mill price would not be an optimal strategy, if final goods producers can easily be identified/distinguished by the input supplier.
At a mill price not higher than A − l 2 /4, even consumers at the two borders with the largest distance to the firm in the market center, would like to buy the final good. We refer to this case as one of full coverage (of consumers) in the subsequent analysis. On the contrary, if the final goods producer sets a mill price which is higher than A − l 2 /4, only consumers that are close enough to the center of country l will buy the final good. We refer to this case as one of partial coverage (of consumers), below. Aggregate demand is given by 2 √ A − p in this case. Finally, if p ≥ A even consumers with the same address as the final goods supplier lose their interest in consumption, so that aggregate demand for the final good falls to zero. Since this case becomes irrelevant if the consumers' willingness to pay is sufficiently high (i.e., A > c i ), we can safely ignore an outcome with p > A in the sequel.
Stage (iv) -Price setting of the final goods producer: The final goods producer sets the profit-maximizing mill price by accounting for (1) . Refraining from outcomes with p > A, we need to distinguish between full coverage with
and partial coverage with D ∈ (0, l) if p ∈ (A − l 2 /4, A). In addition, there are two production modes: (a) in-house production of intermediate goods or (b) outsourcing of input production to an external supplier.
If the single final goods producer located at the center of market l manufactures the input in-house (index i), profits are given by
where the first line represents profits under partial coverage and the second line becomes relevant if there is full coverage, according to (1) . Parameter c i indicates the marginal costs of in-house production. By maximizing profits (2), the final goods producer sets
price under partial coverage is higher than the respective price under full coverage. 9 This indicates a well-known trade-off in the price-setting process. A higher price raises profits for a given level of output but, at the same time, reduces the volume of sales with adverse effects on profits.
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Equations (2) and (3) 
where
2 is the transport-cost-including price of the intermediate good. It depends on input price ρ, and on transport costs t(l/2 − x u ) 2 for shipping the intermediate good from the upstream producer (located at address x u ) to the downstream producer (located at address l/2). Hence, if the two producers are dispersed in space, the costs of final goods production differ from the price charged by the input producer:
Maximizing profits (4) gives
Again, we find that, all other things equal, the final goods producer sets a higher price under partial coverage than under full coverage.
Stage (iii) -Outsourcing decision:
With the results from stage (iv) at hand, we can 9 From (3), it is immediate that p i is continuous in A and c i . Furthermore, substituting the profitmaximizing price p i into profit function π(p i ), it follows from (2) that (maximum) profits are also continuous in A and c i . 10 Of course, lowering p i below A − l 2 /4 cannot be an optimal strategy for the final goods producer, as there is already full coverage at
now turn to the outsourcing decision of the final goods producer. Substituting (3) and (5) for the two mill prices in (2) and (4), we obtain
and
From (6) and (7) it follows immediately that the outsourcing decision depends on the ranking of c i >, =, < ρ d . If the cost of in-house production is lower than the respective cost under outsourcing, i.e., if So far, our analysis has accounted for partial as well as full coverage of consumers.
From now on, however, we focus on a parameter domain that guarantees full coverage under autarky, so that all consumers buy one unit of final output, irrespective of whether outsourcing or integrated production is chosen by the final goods producer. This improves the exposition of our analysis and renders the results in our paper directly comparable to those of Tharakan and Thisse [18] , who impose a similar assumption. A sufficient condition for full coverage in the autarky equilibrium is given by Assumption 1.
Consider integrated production first. By virtue of (3), it follows that the profitmaximizing price of the final goods producer is given by 
where ρ denotes the input price and c u are marginal production costs of the specialized input producer. There are two possible outcomes. If the input producer sets a price such
2 ≤ c i , the final goods producer decides for outsourcing and serves all domestic consumers (according to Assumption 1). On the contrary, if the transportcost-including input price is higher than the cost of in-house production, i.e., if ρ d > c i , the final goods producer prefers the integrated technology. In this case, output and operating profits of the input producer fall to zero. According to (8) , there is a cost advantage of outsourcing as compared to integrated production if c u ≤ c i − t (l/2 − x u ) 2 . Then, the profit-maximizing input price is 11 ρ = c i − t (l/2 − x u ) 2 and the achieved operating profits
Lowering the input price below c i − t (l/2 − x u ) 2 cannot be beneficial, since the input producer already serves the whole domestic market at a price ρ
2 implies that the specialized input producer (if entered at stage (i)) will set a price, which renders the final goods supplier indifferent between integrated production and outsourcing. In this case, the input producer skims the whole specialization rent.
Stage (i) -Entry decision and location choice of the input producer: The input
producer enters and settles down at the profit-maximizing location x u = l/2, if there is a prospect of non-negative profits, i.e., if operating profits χ(ρ) are higher (not lower) than the fixed entry costs f . Accounting for c u < c i , it follows from (8) and (9) that this is the case if the domestic market is sufficiently large, i.e., if l ≥ f / (c i − c u ). On the contrary, if the domestic market is small relative to the fixed set-up costs, i.e., if l < f / (c i − c u ), entry is unattractive for the input producer and only the integrated technology is available to the final goods producer. This implies that the entry decision of the input producer is efficient.
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The main findings of the backward induction are summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, the following holds in the autarky equilibrium:
, the input producer enters and settles at the center of market l,
i.e., at location x u = l/2. Then, ρ = c i and
and final goods prices, respectively, and operating profits are given by χ * = (c i − c u ) l and
, the input producer does not enter so that integrated production prevails. In this case, p i = A−l 2 /4 is the relevant final goods price and
are the corresponding profits.
Proof. Proposition 1 follows from the backward induction above.
In the following analysis, we consider two asymmetrically sized economies: a small one of size s = 1 and a large one of size L > 1. The two countries are adjacent and, due to their size asymmetry, they may differ with respect to the existence of a local input supplier under autarky (see Proposition 1) . In all other respects the two economies are identical and Assumption 1 holds for both countries, so that there is full coverage in 12 One remark is in order here. The autarky results do not depend on our assumption of a single potential entrant in the intermediate goods market. If a second input producer entered, then both competitors would have an incentive to settle down at the same address as the final goods producer. In this case, price competition would lead to ρ = c u and both input producers would make negative profits and, therefore, benefit from leaving the market to save on the fixed set-up costs. Hence, our assumption of a single potential entrant into the intermediate goods market is not as restrictive as it might seem at a first glance.
either economy. Figure 2 illustrates the autarky equilibrium in the two differently sized economies. According to Proposition 1, the final goods producer in country s sets a higher mill price than her counterpart in country L: p
, where superscript a refers to autarky. Serving the whole market implies higher transport costs and, thus, for a given willingness to pay A, a lower mill price in country L. This result clearly depends on Assumption 1 but it is independent of which production techniques are used in the two economies.
>Figure 2<
With respect to the mode of final goods production in the two asymmetrically sized countries, we can distinguish three cases according to Proposition 1: (1) one with no specialized input producer active in countries s and L, i.e., only the integrated production mode is available for the two final goods suppliers; (2) one with outsourcing in the large economy, but integrated production in country s; and (3) one with a specialized input producer in either economy so that both final goods producers outsource intermediate goods production to an external input supplier in their domestic market.
In the next section, we analyze prices and the trade pattern in the free trade equilibrium. Thereby, we assume that location and entry/exit decisions of firms are given (and inherited from the autarky equilibrium). 13 Furthermore, due to the restriction of space and motivated by the empirical stylized fact that national outsourcing is more pronounced in larger economies, 14 we focus on case (2) and assume that there is a single input producer active in the large economy, while autarky production is integrated in country s.
Formally, we consider a parameter domain with
15
13 By ignoring the impact of trade liberalization on entry/exit and location decisions, we take a shortrun perspective. As mentioned earlier, the respective long-run effects can be found in the working paper version of our manuscript in Egger and Egger [6] .
14 Using data for 1995 on purchases of intermediate goods and services in percent of gross production from EUROSTAT (Input-Output Tables) as a measure of national outsourcing, we find that national outsourcing of EU15 countries is positively associated with population size with a correlation coefficient of 0.54. 15 For a discussion on cases (1) and (3) we refer the interested reader to the working paper version of our manuscript in Egger and Egger [6] .
To analyze the impact of trade liberalization, we follow the common approach and assume 
If the mill price of the final goods producer in country L is sufficiently small compared to the respective price of her competitor, all consumers prefer the final good from the 16 Note that a consumer at address b prefers the final good produced in country
supplier in the large economy and the marginal consumer is located at address x m = 0, i.e., at the remote border from the perspective of the final goods producer in country L.
In this case, demand for country s production falls to zero. On the contrary, if the final goods producer in country L sets a particularly high mill price relative to her competitor in the small economy, the marginal consumer will be located at address x m = L + 1 and demand for final goods from country L falls to zero. Finally, if the price differential is not too high, the marginal consumer will be located in the interior of the integrated market, at some address x m ∈ (0, L + 1).
Knowing the location of the marginal consumer, however, is not sufficient for a characterization of consumer demand. The reason is that we cannot rule out in general that there is partial coverage of consumers under free trade, although Assumption 1 guarantees full coverage under autarky. Under partial coverage, the willingness to pay, A, becomes a relevant criterion in the determination of consumer demand. Abstracting from the possbility of p k > A, k = s, L, we can introduce the following four variables:
Then, max(0, w) gives a left bound for consumers of country s production. If 0 > w, the willingness to pay of all consumers in the hinterland 17 of country s exceeds the transport-cost-including price for purchases of country s production. If, on the contrary, w > 0, consumers in interval [0, w)
lose the incentive to purchase the final good from the producer in the small economy, as their willingness to pay, A, is lower than the transport-cost-including price,
Furthermore, min(v, x m ) determines a right bound for consumers of country s production.
If x m < v, the location of the marginal consumer, who -in the case of an interior solution -is indifferent between buying the final good from the supplier in the large or the supplier 17 The hinterland of country s is given by the line segment between 0 and 1/2, while the line segment between 1 + L/2 and L + 1 determines the hinterland of country L.
in the small economy, constrains demand from the perspective of the country s producer.
If, on the contrary, v < x m , then address v > 1/2 becomes the relevant constraint, as the transport-cost-including price of country s production exceeds the willingness to pay of consumers with address b > v. The respective bounds for consumers of country L production are given by min(L + 1, y) and max(z, x m ), with y and z having similar interpretations as v and w.
One further remark is in order here. At this stage of our analysis, we cannot rule out that either z < w or v > y holds. In this case, we have a corner solution either with zero demand for country s production (if z < w) or with zero demand for country L production (if v > y). With these insights at hand, we can now characterize consumer demand for final goods production in the two economies:
with D s , D L denoting demand for country s production and country L production, respectively. Eqs. (13) and (14) as special cases. The first lines of these equations coincide with the respective expressions in Tharakan and Thisse [18] . For an interpretation of the demand system in (13) and (14), let us abstract from the possibility of corner solutions. Then, w ≤ 0 implies v ≥ 1 and, thus, full coverage of country s consumers, according to (11) . If, in addition, y ≥ L + 1 and thus z ≤ 1, there is also full coverage of country L consumers, according to (12) .
An outcome with full coverage of consumers in both economies is similar to the autarky equilibrium. However, consumers can purchase the final good from either supplier after trade liberalization, so that demand is no longer symmetric around the center of the local market if x m = 1. This renders the location of the marginal consumer a key element of the subsequent analysis.
Partial coverage of consumers requires either w > 0 (and thus v < 1) or y < L+1 (and thus z > 1). By virtue of Proposition 1 and the formal analysis in Section 4, this implies that partial coverage becomes an issue only if trade liberalization leads to an increase in the price charged by at least one of the two final goods producers. To illustrate the possibility of partial coverage, consider for example a scenario with 1/2 < x m < v. Then, w > 0 (and, thus, v < 1) implies that part of the consumers to the left of the final goods supplier in country s do not purchase a final good. However, x m < v < 1 is sufficient for z < 1 and, by virtue of (12), also sufficient for y > L + 1. Hence, there is full coverage of consumers in the large economy, according to (14) . With the demand system in eqs. (13) and (14) at hand, we can now proceed to stage (iv) of our analysis.
Stage (iv) -Price setting of the two final goods producers: Moreover, in the case of outsourcing let ρ k,d be the transport-cost-including input price paid by the final goods producer located at the center of country k = s, L. Given the autarky location of the input producer in country L, we obtain
, where (L + 1) /2 is the distance between the final goods producer in s and the input supplier in L (see Figure 2 ).
Since we account for two different modes of final goods production, namely in-house manufacture and purchases of intermediate goods from an external supplier at arm's length, it is meaningful to introduce a new variable c k , which allows us to address the cost of final goods production in country k = s, L without any reference to the particular technology in use in the final goods sector. To be more specific, in the following we use
if the final goods producer in country
k chooses the integrated production mode, while c k = ρ k,d , if the final goods producer engages in outsourcing. Using this notation, it follows from (13) and (14) that free trade profits of the final goods producers in s and L are given by
respectively.
For the case of integrated production in both economies, Tharakan and Thisse [18] identify four parameter domains, which determine the set of possible price equilibria. It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a rigorous analysis of all possible parameter domains. Therefore, we introduce a further empirically plausible assumption, namely that trade liberalization has a pro-competitive effect (cf. Levinsohn [11] ) and, by virtue of Assumption 1, leads to full coverage under free trade. Taking into account that c k ≤ c i must hold (see stage (iii) below), a sufficient condition for such an outcome is given by Assumption 2.
the following holds in a free trade equilibrium. First, demand for final goods produced at the two locations is given by
, respectively. Hence, there is full coverage in the free trade equilibrium with each consumer buying one unit of final output, i.e.,
Second, profits of the two final goods producers are given by
Proof. See Appendix A. she is resident of the small country, there are final goods exports of the large economy. On the contrary, if she is resident of the large economy, it is the small country that exports the final good.
Before we can determine the address of the marginal consumer, we need to search for the profit-maximizing prices of the two final goods producers. To obtain a unique set of equilibrium final goods prices, we impose a restriction on the price-setting behavior of
19 Then, maximizing profits (17) and (18) gives, according to (10),
where γ A closer look on the role of production costs c s and c L for price-setting of the two final goods producers seems to be worthwhile. Let us first consider a scenario with a positive sales level of both final goods producers, 0 < x m < L + 1. Then, a lower cost of the 19 It is shown in the proof of Appendix A that some p k < c k may be consistent with an equilibrium, if there are zero sales of the final goods producer located in country k. Such price equilibria are ruled out by the proposed assumption on the price-setting behavior of firms. For a logically similar problem in a different context, see Ludema and Wooton [12] . 20 The existence of a price equilibrium (19) and (20) critically depends on the assumption of quadratic transport costs. d'Aspremont et al. [5] show that a minimum distance between the locations of the two final goods producers is essential for the existence of a Nash equilibrium in prices under linear transport costs. However, as demonstrated in Tharakan [17] , this "minimum distance condition" is not satisfied by locations 1/2 and 1 + L/2 of the two final goods producers (and country sizes L > s = 1). Therefore, a price equilibrium under linear transport costs is not consistent with our assumptions regarding the locations of the two final goods producers (at least if marginal production costs of the two final goods producers are identical, i.e., if c s = c L ; see our discussion below).
final goods producer in country L, i.e., a decline in c L for a given c s , makes this producer more competitive and gives her an incentive to set a lower mill price p * L . The lower mill price induces a higher sales level, which comes at the cost of lower final goods sales by the competitor in country s. The final goods producer in country s has therefore an incentive to lower her mill price as well to defend her market shares. For a similar reason, a lower c s leads to a decline in both mill prices and p * s , p * L turn out to be strategic complements. From (19) and (20), we see that it is the direct effect of a cost reduction that dominates, generates a spatial asymmetry: The distance to the remote border is larger for the final goods producer in the small economy than for her counterpart in the large economy. As a consequence, the critical cost differential γ 2 is larger than the respective cost differential
We can now substitute (19) and (20) for p s and p L in (10) to obtain the equilibrium location of the marginal consumer as a function of marginal production costs c s and c L :
Again, three regimes are distinguished in (21), with the intuition behind these regimes following from former discussions below (10) and (20) . In the border line case of identical production costs, c s = c L , the marginal consumer is located at address x m = (5L + 7)/12
and is, therefore, resident of the large economy. As a consequence, it is the small country that exports the final good if production costs c s and c L are symmetric. This is the case considered in Tharakan and Thisse [18] , who emphasize the geographical disadvantage of large economies. In our analysis, however, production costs c s and c L may differ due to the existence of a local input producer in the large economy. Hence, from now on we focus on the role of outsourcing opportunities in determining the location of the marginal consumer. In particular, we show under which conditions there is international outsourcing in equilibrium and how transport costs influence the price choice of the input producer and thus the cost differential c L − c s in equilibrium.
Stage (iii) -Outsourcing decision:
In analogy to the autarky scenario, the final goods
Otherwise, production is integrated. As a consequence, we have c
Stage (ii) -Price setting of the input producer: The price choice of the input producer clearly depends on whether she serves both final goods suppliers or only one of the two competitors. By lowering the price vis-à-vis one final goods producer, she makes this firm more competitive, with positive effects on the respective output level. However, with input sales to both final goods producers, such a discriminative price reduction lowers the volume of input sales to the other final goods competitor. In this case, the input producer cannibalizes her own market by setting a lower price vis-à-vis one final goods supplier. Of course, such a cannibalization effect cannot arise if the input producer only serves one of the two final goods producers.
If the input supplier sets prices that render the two final goods producers indifferent between the two available production modes, i.e., if
the volume of overall input sales is maximized and given by
21 As a consequence, if 21 In this case, the input price vis-à-vis the final goods producer in country s is lower than the respective price vis-à-vis the final goods producer in country L, i.e., ρ s < ρ L , as the input producer is located at the center of the large economy. goods exports to country s are associated with non-negative operating profits, so that outsourcing becomes available to the final goods producer in the small economy (international outsourcing). We investigate the high transport cost scenario first.
High transport costs -no international outsourcing
If t > 4(c i −c u )/(L+1) 2 , the input producer only serves the final goods producer in country L and there is national but no international outsourcing after trade liberalization. In this case, the operating profits of the input producer are given by Recall that (L + 1)/2 is the distance between the two market centers, so that ρ 
Lemma 1. Maximizing the profits in (22) gives the following input price:
ρ L * =          c i − γ 1 c i +cu 2 + (7L+5)(L+1) 8 c i if if if c i > c i c i ∈ c i , c i c i ∈ c u , c i ,(23)
24
The input producer faces the following trade-off, when setting the profit-maximizing input price. On the one hand, a lower price reduces revenues for a given volume of sales (revenue effect). On the other hand, it increases demand for intermediate goods (as long as x m > 0 -output effect). To be more specific, from the discussion below eqs. (19) and (20), we know that a decline in ρ L = c L makes the final goods producer in the large economy more competitive and provides an incentive for this producer to lower the profit-maximizing mill price p * L (direct effect). Since final goods prices are strategic complements, p * s falls as well (indirect effect). According to (19) and (20) The larger country L (and, thus, the larger its hinterland), the stronger is the revenue effect, and the lower are, all other things equal, the incentives of the input producer for a price reduction. Furthermore, the lower the cost differential c i − c u , the smaller is the 24 The input price does not depend on transport cost parameter t, as long as intermediate goods exports
s , according to (19) and (20) . Furthermore, the marginal consumer is located at address x * m = (5L + 7)/12 > 1 in this case (see (21)).
scope for a decline in ρ L . Thus, it is intuitive that the input producer sets ρ L = c i and, thereby, renders the final goods producer indifferent between the two available production modes, if country L is large and the cost differential c i − c u is moderate. In this case, the marginal consumer is located at address x * m = (5L + 7)/12 and, therefore, resident of the large economy (see Figure 3 and Footnote 25). If, on the contrary, country L is small and the cost differential is sizable, the input producer charges a low price. There is, however, no incentive to choose an input price lower than c i − γ 1 , as the marginal consumer is 27 From Section 4, we know that the notion of a "cost advantage of outsourcing" refers to cheaper production under outsourcing than under integrated production. This is a prerequisite for the "outsourcingrelated production cost advantage of country L" (over country s), which arises due to the existence of a local input producer and the related domestic outsourcing opportunities in country L. ules in Figure 3 . In contrast, the marginal consumer is located in L and the small country 
Low transport costs -international outsourcing
If transport costs for input transactions are sufficiently low, i.e., if
the input producer earns non-negative operating profits from sales to the final goods producer in country s, if she sets a price ρ s ∈ c u , c i − t (L + 1) 2 /4 . Moreover, recall that the whole integrated market (L + 1) can be served at input prices ρ
and that the input producer can avoid detrimental profit effects from cannibalizing her own market, if she sets the two input prices not lower given by
The two regimes in (25) have the same interpretation as the respective regimes in (22),
Using ρ s * = c i −t (L + 1) 2 /4 in the profit-maximization problem of the input producer
. This is used in (25).
gives the following price vis-à-vis the final goods supplier in country L 
The interpretation of (27) is similar to that one of (24) Proof. Proposition 2 follows from the analysis above.
To conclude this section, we can compare our findings with previous insights on the role of trade liberalization for the structure of industrial production. If there is international outsourcing in the free trade equilibrium, the input producer serves the whole integrated market in our model. In this case, our results are in line with the finding of McLaren [13] that lower trade barriers lead to leaner and less integrated firms. However, the positive effects of free trade are less clear in new trade theory models with imperfect competition in goods markets. Wong [19] gives an excellent overview on the gains from trade for economies under market imperfections. 
no final goods trade 0 0 0
country L amb. + + Notes: In this matrix, "+", "−", and "0" mean that trade liberalization has a positive, negative or no effect on the respective welfare levels. "amb." indicates that the impact is ambiguous.
36 A formal proof of the results in Table 1 is relegated to Appendix B.
As far as spatial models are concerned, Tharakan and Thisse [18] 
Concluding remarks
This paper develops a theory of outsourcing and trade in a spatial modelà la Hotelling, where countries are treated as areas rather than points. By emphasizing the role of outsourcing opportunities, our analysis is able to identify a trade-off of being large. On the one hand, firms in geographically large economies face a transport-cost-related disadvantage with respect to serving consumers close to borders. On the other hand, if geographically large economies are population-rich, they have an outsourcing-related production cost advantage due to a higher degree of vertical specialization.
37 Tharakan [17] shows in a Hotelling model that both the geographical sizes and the population densities of countries are important determinants of the welfare effects of trade liberalization. Behrens et al. [3] discuss the welfare effects of reductions in both international trade barriers as well as national/regional transport costs.
In this setting, we investigate trade liberalization between two asymmetrically sized economies. In particular, we identify the main economic fundamentals which determine 
according to (10) , (11), (13) and (15) . Moreover, define D 
respectively. Profits π s are continuous in p s and can be written as a composite of φ 
Evaluating (32)- (34) at autarky prices p In view of (35)-(37), it can be shown that, for any c 
according to (10) , (12), (14) and (16) . (10) and (12) . Substituting
respectively. Profits π L are continuous in p L and can be written as a composite of φ 
According to (45)-(47), it follows that, for any c 
(These prices are obtained by setting (32) and (42) equal to zero. The second-order conditions for profit maxima are fulfilled, due to (49) in (10)- (14) gives
so that an interior solution with Step ( 
and, therefore, establishes Lemma 1.
Appendix B: Formal derivation of the welfare effects of trade liberalization Assumption 2 is considered throughout Appendix B.
40 Note that an outcome with 0 < z < w is inconsistent with profit-maximization of the final goods producer in country s, while an outcome with L + 1 > v > y is inconsistent with profit-maximization of the final goods producer in country L. Hence, these two cases -which are related to the second lines in eqs. (13) and (14) 
where 
where c i = c u + (7L + 5) (L + 1) /4, according to (23), and c i :
are used. Thus, (53) can be rewritten as
Using x * m , according to (24), and substituting (56) into (55) gives
and, therefore, ∆W 
